Theory of Perception in the Light of the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness

Transcript

[Page 1] [Inserted Text in Margin: Theory of Perception in the Light of the] [Underlined: Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness] Let us consider the ingression of a sense object into space- time. Let [Underlined: A] be a region and [Underlined: B] be another such region. These regions may be called standpoint. The sense object let us say the color green, ingresses into the region. [Underlined: A] When some sense object ingresses into A it does not do as "simply" as the classical theory supposes, but rather dually. The ingression of the sense object involves at least three factors, the sense [Page 2] object and the two regions. When the sense object is present in [Underlined: A], it has a mode of locations in some other region [Underlined: B], when it is perceived as located. To the ancient questions, "Is the green in the observer or the observed?" Whitehead answers, "Both, but in a different sense." The basic postulate here is the essential interconnectedness of space-time. The particular application is the assertion that any sense-object ingredient into some chunk of space. Time carries with it an implicit reference to other space-time. The [MS:Illegible] unification, i. e. a certain "act of perception" may be said to have simple locations, but the same object may not. In the words of the early works, objects are only [MS:Illegible] in space time and may be again [Page 3] Events may not be again. They are [MS:Illegible] temporally unique. Wh's initial effort in solving the familiar difficulties of epistemology, in the transition period is thus an exposure of the Fallacy of Simple locations and the proposal of a substitute which transfers "simple location" from objects to events.